The Middle East: The Sunni-Shia Dialectic

1. BASIC FACTS & HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The struggle between Sunni and Shia Islam is one of the most enduring and consequentially schismatic struggles in human history. It is a conflict that defies simple explanation, residing at the intersection of theology, politics, power, and identity. Its origins are not in a dispute over core tenets of faith—both groups share the identical fundamental declaration that there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger—but in a primal question of leadership and legitimacy following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE.

This initial divergence (khilaf) over succession created the fault line. The group that would become the Sunni (from Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamāah, "People of the Tradition and the Community") held that leadership should follow the consensus of the community and be elected from among the most qualified. The first four "Rightly Guided Caliphs" (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) were accepted in this tradition. The group that would become the Shia (from Shīatu Alī, or the "Party of Ali") believed that leadership was a divine right, bestowed by God upon the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt), beginning with his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib.

The schism was strengthened by tragedy. The assassination of Caliph Uthman, the contested rule of Ali, and most profoundly, the massacre of Ali’s son and the Prophet’s grandson, Hussein, and his followers at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE became the defining martyrdom narrative for Shia Islam, embedding a legacy of persecution, resistance, and yearning for justice.

For centuries, the divide was often managed within the broader framework of early Islamic empires (Umayyad, Abbasid, Ottoman, Safavid), where Sunni rulers were often dominant, and Shia communities existed as minority populations; at worst persecuted, at best tolerated. The modern, geopolitical manifestation of the conflict is inextricably linked to the events of the 20th century: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the drawing of colonial borders by European powers (Sykes-Picot), the discovery of vast oil reserves, and the Cold War.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran was the definitive watershed moment, creating a revolutionary, Shia-theocratic state that explicitly challenged the regional status quo and the authority of Sunni-dominated monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. This set the stage for a modern-day regional cold war, fought through proxy conflicts, sectarian rhetoric, and a struggle for hegemony from the Mediterranean to the Hindu Kush.

2. PERSPECTIVES

The conflict is defined by layered narratives that blend theological legitimacy with raw political power.

01
The Geopolitical/Sectarian Narrative (Sunni-led States): 

For nations like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, the rise of Iran represents an existential threat. This perspective frames Iran as a revolutionary power seeking to export its ideology and destabilize the region through proxy militias (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, various Shia militias in Iraq). The conflict is presented as a defense of Sunni Islam and regional stability against Persian-Shia expansionism and terrorism. From this viewpoint, the Shia revivalism promoted by Iran is a fundamental challenge to the established order and the authority of traditional Sunni religious institutions.

02
The Resistance/Anti-Imperialist Narrative (Shia-led Iran and Allies):   

Iran and its allied groups frame their actions not as sectarian aggression but as a legitimate axis of resistance (muqawama) against Western imperialism (primarily the United States and Israel) and its regional allies (Saudi Arabia, UAE). They point to the support of these Sunni states for Western policies and Israel as evidence of collaboration with their oppressors. Within this narrative, support for Shia communities abroad is portrayed as protecting oppressed minorities from Sunni-dominated governments and defending Islamic lands from foreign domination. The struggle is for justice and sovereignty, with sectarian identity being a mobilizing force within that larger fight.

03
The Internal Minority/Majority Narrative:  

Within multi-sectarian states like Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Syria, the dynamic gets more complex. Here, Shia communities, often historically marginalized from power despite constituting large population shares (or even majorities, as in Iraq and Bahrain), have sought greater political representation and rights. Sunni communities, particularly those who held power under previous regimes (e.g., Saddam Hussein's Iraq), often view the Shia ascendancy—bolstered by Iranian influence—as a loss of privilege and a threat to their identity and security. This creates a vicious cycle of sectarian mobilization, fear, and violence, where political grievances are increasingly expressed through a sectarian lens.

04
The Jihadist-Salafist Narrative (e.g., ISIS):  

Groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) represent a hyper-sectarian, eliminativists perspective. They draw from a radical Salafist ideology that declares Shia Muslims to be apostates (takfir) deserving of death. For ISIS, the conflict is not geopolitical but an existential religious war to purify Islam and reestablish a caliphate. Their extreme violence against Shia civilians and Shia holy sites aims to provoke a full-scale sectarian war, believing it will force Sunnis to choose sides and rally to their banner.

3. PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION & ANALYSIS

Central Question: When a schism is rooted in both faith and politics, can the pursuit of justice and security for one community ever be reconciled with the same for the other?
This dilemma forces an examination of the nature of identity, the cycle of historical grievance, and whether political structures can ever transcend deeply ingrained sectarian paradigms.

A. Philosophical Lenses:

01
Hegel and the Master-Slave Dialectic:

Hegel’s concept of the struggle for recognition is profoundly illuminating. The Sunni-Shia relationship can be viewed as a centuries-long dialectic where each group seeks recognition from the other. For much of history, a Sunni "master" narrative dominated, with Shia Islam occupying a subjugated "slave" consciousness, defining itself through resistance and martyrdom. The 1979 Iran revolution and the post-2003 changes in Iraq can be seen as a moment of upheaval, where the "slave" (Shia power) demands recognition and overturns the established hierarchy. However, this new dynamic risks simply inverting the power relationship rather than achieving any synthesis of mutual recognition and equality, perpetuating the cycle of conflict.

02
Communitarianism (Sandel, MacIntyre) vs. Cosmopolitanism: 

The conflict is a stark example of communitarian forces. Identity is deeply constituted by membership in a sectarian community—Sunni or Shia—with its own history, narratives, rituals, and heroes (e.g., Hussein for Shia, the Sahaba for Sunni). These communal identities provide meaning but also create sharp boundaries against the "other." A cosmopolitan or liberal individualist approach, which prioritizes universal human rights and individual autonomy over group identity, struggles to gain traction in this environment. The question becomes: can a larger, supranational "Islamic" or "national" community be forged that respects and contains these distinct sectarian communitarian identities without demanding their dissolution?

03
The Philosophy of History and Nietzsche's Ressentiment: 

 Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment—a political pessimism and hatred born of impotence and historical grievance—is a powerful tool for analysis. The Shia narrative of persecution, from Karbala to the present day, can be viewed as a form of collectively embodied ressentiment, which has been transformed in the modern era from passive suffering into a potent political and revolutionary force. Conversely, Sunni communities who have lost political dominance (e.g., in Iraq) are now developing their own ressentiment, a sense of victimhood and bitterness at their displacement. This competing victimhood makes reconciliation exceptionally difficult, as each side's identity is fortified by its narrative of past suffering.

04
John Rawls' Theory of Justice and the Veil of Ignorance: 

Applying Rawls's thought experiment to the Middle East probes: what principles of justice would Sunni and Shia leaders choose if they were behind a "veil of ignorance," not knowing which sect they would belong to in the society they were designing? Ideally, they would choose a state that guarantees equal rights, freedom of religious practice, and a fair distribution of resources and political power, as no one would want to risk being part of a persecuted minority. The current reality, where constitutions and power-sharing agreements (e.g., in Lebanon, Iraq) are often brittle and based on sectarian quota systems, falls short of this ideal, as they institutionalize sectarian difference rather than transcending it.

B. Religious and Theological Perspectives:

01
Islamic Theology and the Concept of Fitna: 

Within Islam, fitna refers to trial, temptation, discord, or civil strife. Many mainstream Islamic scholars, both Sunni and Shia, view the current violence as a profound fitna that is tearing the Muslim ummah (community) apart. Theologically, there is a strong imperative for unity and against sectarian division. Qur'anic verses and hadiths warn Muslims against dividing into sects. This provides a powerful internal theological basis for peacebuilding and dialogue, a call to return to the core, unifying principles of Islam above sectarian identity.

02
Theology of Liberation and Martyrdom: 

Shia Islam, with its central narrative of Hussein's martyrdom at Karbala, has a deeply embedded "liberation theology." Hussein's stand is framed as the ultimate sacrifice against tyranny and injustice (zulm). This provides a powerful religious framework for political resistance and revolution, as seen in Iran. Conversely, it can be interpreted by others as a theology of perpetual victimhood and conflict. On the Sunni side, Salafi-jihadist groups have co-opted the concept of martyrdom (shahada) for their own political projects, creating a violent and mirroring theology.

03
Confucianism and Legalism (A Comparative Lens): 

Much like the Chinese state's approach in other contexts, regional powers often employ a blend of Legalist and community-focused strategies. Saudi Arabia uses a Legalist approach internally (strict enforcement of its religious doctrine) and externally (hard power, economic sanctions). Iran uses a revolutionary-legalist model, enforcing its ideology and supporting proxy forces. Both, however, utilize a rhetoric of community harmony—be it the Sunni ummah or the Shia Ummat al-Mustaz'afin (Community of the Oppressed). A critique from within any ethical tradition, including Islamic ones, would ask whether true harmony can be built through coercion, power politics, and the exclusion of the other, or if it must be founded on mercy (rahmah), justice (adl), and mutual respect.

The Sunni-Shia conflict presents a fundamental ethical challenge: can political systems be designed that do not merely manage sectarian hatred but actively overcome it through a shared vision of citizenship? It questions whether the pursuit of security through dominance is a sustainable path, or if a more difficult road—based on recognizing the other's historical suffering and right to exist—is the only way to break a cycle of violence that is centuries in the making.

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Further Reading:

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.
Ajami, Fouad. The Syrian Rebellion. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2012.
Hegel, G.W.F. Phenomenology of Spirit. 1807.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality. 1887.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
Esposito, John L. and Dalia Mogahed. Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think. New York: Gallup Press, 2007.
International Crisis Group. "The Sunni-Shia Divide in the Middle East." Middle East Report N°184, 28 April 2020.